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I. Introduction
Facing otherness was not merely an inevitable feature of life in France’s culturally 
diverse North American empire, it stood in some fundamental sense at its very 
center. I propose to begin this reflection on those implications of the European 
confrontation with human diversity that were specific to French America by 
considering an experiment in cultural exchange engineered by Samuel Champlain. 
In 1610, early in his tenure as leader of the Québec colony, Champlain sent several 
young Frenchmen to live with Amerindian communities, ranging from nearby 
Algonquin groups to the considerably more distant Huron settled along the Great 
Lakes, and in return welcomed the children of Amerindian leaders into the French 
settlement. Champlain hoped that his emissaries would familiarize themselves 
with their hosts’ cultures, learn their languages, and glean valuable information 
about the fur trade, local politics, geography, and a possible northwest passage, so 
that they could subsequently serve him as interpreters and informants1.
Traditional historiographical treatments of New France accorded Franco-
Amerindian encounters like these little emphasis, focusing instead on the 
1 See Gilles Havard, Empire et métissages. Indiens et Français dans le Pays d’en Haut 1660-1715 
(Paris: Septentrion-Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 65, 389.
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origins and growth of European settlement and political institutions. These 
historians founded their work on the notion that the history of French North 
America and of Amerindians represented two separate (albeit related) histories2. 
For much of the twentieth century, Québécois historians were preoccupied with 
tracing the contours of the Belle province’s distinct society and uncovering its 
distinctively French roots, and therefore relegated the history of Amerindians 
and their relations with the French to an even harder to reach back burner3.
Beginning in the 1960s, as scholars increasingly turned their attention to the 
history of the native peoples of the Americas, they likewise began to think about 
the history of European-Amerindian contact in new, more complex ways – and to 
credit them with growing historical significance. Historians developed concepts 
like ‘frontier’, ‘borderlands’, ‘backcountry’, and Richard White’s influential 
‘middle ground’ in order to problematize these interactions in ways which 
acknowledge the phenomenon of European empire, the structuring influence 
of power, and the historical reality of violence on the one hand, and the spaces 
for cooperation and collaboration, negotiation and compromise, Amerindian 
agency and autonomy on the other4. Their work not only drew attention to areas 
2 On how the historiographies of Canada and of Amerindians developed separately, see James 
W. St. G. Walker, “The Indian in Canadian Historical Writing”, Historical Papers / Communications 
historiques, 6, 1 (1971): 21-51, and Bruce G. Trigger, “The Historian’s Indian: Native Americans 
in Canadian Historical Writing from Charlevoix to the Present”, Canadian Historical Review, 
67, 3 (1986): 315-342; and in the French Canadian context in particular, Sylvie Vincent, “Les 
Manuels d’histoire sont-ils porteurs de stéréotypes sur les Amérindiens, ou Que sont devenus 
le ‘bon Huron’ et le ‘méchant Iroquois’?”, Bulletin de la Société des Professeurs d’Histoire du Québec, 
16, 2 (1978): 25-28, and Christian Laville, “Les Amérindiens d’hier dans les manuels d’histoire 
d’aujourd’hui”, Traces, 29, 2 (1991), 29-33. For parallel developments in the historiography of the 
United States, see James H. Merrell, “Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American 
Indians”, William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., 46, 1 (January 1989): 94-119, Bernard W. Sheehan, 
“Indian-White Relations in Early America: A Review Essay”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 
26, 2 (April 1960): 267-286, and James Axtell, “Europeans, Indians, and the Age of Discovery in 
American History Textbooks”, American Historical Review, 92, 3 (June 1987): 621-632.
3  For reviews of the historiography of New France, see John C. Rule, “The Old Regime in America: 
A Review of Recent Interpretations of France in America”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 19, 
4 (October 1962): 575-600, Allan Greer, “Comparisons: New France”, in A Companion to Colonial 
America, ed. Daniel Vickers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 469-88, and Gilles Havard and Cécile Vidal, 
“Making New France New Again: French Historians Rediscover their American Past”, Common-
Place, 7, 4 (July 2007), www.common-place.org/vol-07/no-4/harvard/ (consulted 7 May 2010).
4 For overviews of the frontier/borderland historiography, see David J. Weber, “Turner, the 
Boltonians, and the Borderlands”, American Historical Review 91, 1 (February 1986): 66-81, Jeremy 
Adelman and Stephen Aron, “From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the 
Peoples in between in North American History”, American Historical Review 104, 3 (June 1999): 
814-841, and the forum published in the subsequent issue, esp. Evan Haefeli, “A Note on the Use 
of North American Borderlands”, John R. Wunder and Pekka Hämäläinen, “Of Lethal Places and 
Lethal Essays”, and Adelman and Aron’s response, “Of Lively Exchanges and Larger Perspectives”, 
American Historical Review, 104, 4 (October 1999): 1222-1225, 1229-1234 and 1235-1239. Weber 
returned to the problem in “The Spanish Borderlands, Historiography Redux”, History Teacher, 
39, 1 (November 2005): 43-56. On the “middle ground’ concept, see Richard White, The Middle 
Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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long neglected by scholarship, it demonstrated that the history of New France in 
particular, and of the colonial Americas more generally, could not be understood 
without taking Amerindians into account5.
These scholars assigned considerable prominence in their research to 
Amerindian-European interactions like the exchange of French and Amerindian 
youths imagined by Champlain. Underscoring how frequent and intense such 
exchanges were, their work mapped the complex contours of European-Amerindian 
contact. They construed such encounters to be components of the frontier 
experience, liminal situations in which the distinct worlds of French settlers 
and Amerindian societies met, a phase of coexistence that was both initiated and 
bounded in time by the steady imposition of European control in the Americas.
By situating these interactions within the broader context of the construction 
of European Atlantic empires, their work drew particular attention to the crucial 
role of cultural intermediaries in brokering such relationships – and in providing 
imperial authorities the information and tools they needed to establish and 
expand their authority6. Perhaps the most striking illustration of how Europeans 
University Press, 1991), as well as the forums on “A Historian Who Has Changed Our Thinking: A 
Roundtable on the Work of Richard White”, in Western Historical Quarterly, 33, 2 (Summer 2002), 
and on “The Middle Ground Revisited’ in William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 63, 1 (January 2006).
5 James Axtell argues that indigenous peoples shaped the history of colonial America in 
decisive ways in “Colonial America without the Indians: Counterfactual Reflections”, Journal 
of American History, 73, 4 (March 1987): 981-996. For reviews of Amerindians” evolving place 
within the historiography, see Daniel Richter, “Whose Indian History?”, William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd ser., 50, no. 2 (April 1993): 379-393, and Ian Steele, “Exploding Colonial American 
History: Amerindian, Atlantic, and Global Perspectives”, Review in American History, 26, 1 (March 
1998): 70-95. For recent overviews of New France’s history which follow this perspective, see for 
example Philip Boucher, Les Nouvelles Frances. France in America, 1500-1815. An Imperial Perspective 
(Providence, R. I.: John Carter Brown Library, 1989) and France and the American Tropics to 1700: 
Tropics of Discontent? (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), and Gilles Havard and 
Cécile Vidal, Histoire de l’Amérique française (2003), 2nd ed. (Paris: Flammarion, 2006).
6 Cultural and social anthropologists have contributed to a substantial body of scholarship 
theorizing the complex roles cultural intermediaries play. See for example Clifford Geertz, 
“The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker”, Comparative Studies in Society and 
History 2, 2 (1960): 228-249 and Irwin Press, “Ambiguity and Innovation: Implications for the 
Genesis of the Culture Broker”, American Anthropologist, 71, 2 (1969): 205-217. More specifically, 
historians of early modern and modern empires are increasingly underscoring go-betweens” 
roles – see for example Ralph A. Austen, and Jonathan Derrick, Middlemen of the Cameroons 
Rivers: The Duala and their Hinterland, c. 1600-c. 1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim Societies and French Colonial Authorities 
in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880-1920 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), Jeremy D. Cohen, 
“Cultural and Commercial Intermediaries in an Extra-Legal System of Exchange: The Practicos 
of the Venezuelan Littoral in the Eighteenth Century”, Itinerario, 27, 2 (2003): 105-124, Alida C. 
Metcalf, Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 
2005), Intermediaries, Interpreters, and Clerks: African Employees in the Making of Colonial Africa, eds. 
Benjamin N. Lawrance, Emily Lynn Osborn, and Richard L. Roberts (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2006), and Natalie Rothman, “Between Venice and Istanbul: Trans-Imperial 
Subjects and Cultural Mediation in the Early Modern Mediterranean’, Ph.D dissertation 
(University of Michigan, 2006). In the context of the colonial Americas, see for example Daniel 
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mobilized go-betweens to further their imperial interests is Hernan Cortés’s 
conquest of Mexico. When Cortés landed in the Yucatán, he could draw on 
the local knowledge and linguistics skills of a Spanish priest who had been 
shipwrecked on the peninsula seven years before, and who during his time in 
captivity among the Mayans had learned their language, to win the cooperation 
of Mayan groups. When the conquistador marched on Tenochtitlan at the head of 
a Spanish-Mayan army, he turned for help to La Malinche, an Aztec noblewoman 
who had been sold to the Mayans as a slave, and who had been given to Cortés as 
a gift. Her mastery of her native Nahuatl proved decisive in helping the Spanish 
decipher internal Aztec politics7.
While such perspectives have shed crucial light on the importance of native-
European relationships in the history of the early modern Americas, my goal 
in this brief article is to suggest that they do not adequately represent the full 
importance of coexistence in the case of New France. I argue here that cultural 
intermediaries played an especially important role in French North America, 
and contributed to the establishment, extension and perpetuation of French 
imperial power in decisive ways. I argue further that intermediaries’ particular 
prominence was specific to the French case, far surpassing that enjoyed by their 
counterparts in the other European powers’ spheres of American influence.
Why did cultural intermediaries enjoy special prominence in New France? 
This article briefly traces a twofold explanation. Champlain’s project to embed 
young Frenchmen among well-disposed Amerindian communities is telling for 
two reasons: first, it testifies to how concerned French colonial administrators 
were to train or recruit intermediaries to help them cultivate and maintain 
relationships with neighboring Amerindian groups; second, it illustrates that 
the close proximity of French and Amerindians in New France made this not 
only an urgent imperative, but one which was relatively straightforward for 
the French to meet. By helping French and Amerindian interlocutors bridge a 
multitude of difficult language and cultural barriers, intermediaries satisfied a 
host of important cultural, commercial, social and political functions within the 
spheres of French influence in North America. A variety of middlemen, ranging 
K. Richter, “Cultural Brokers and Intercultural Politics: New York-Iroquois Relations, 1664-
1701”, Journal of American History, 75 (1988): 40-67. On linguistic intermediaries in particular, 
see The Language Encounter in the Americas, 1492-1800, ed, by Edward C. Gray and Norman Fiering 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), James Axtell, Natives and Newcomers: The Cultural Origins of 
North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), Stephen Greenblatt, “Learning to Curse: 
Aspects of Linguistic Colonialism in the Sixteenth Century”, in Learning to Curse Essays in Early 
Modern Culture (London: Routledge, 1990), 16-39, and Greenblatt, Marvellous Possessions: The 
Wonder of the New World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
7 See Frances Karttunen, Between Worlds: Interpreters, Guides, and Survivors (Piscataway, N. J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1994), 1-22, and Cortés’s own testimony, in La Conquête du Mexique, 
Désiré Charnay (trans.) (Paris: La Découverte, 1991), letter 1, 55. See also Marie-Christine 
Gomez-Géraud, “La lengua: problemáticas del encuentro en la conquista de Méjico”, in Diálogo 
y conflicto de culturas: estudios comparativos de procesos transculturales entre Europe y América Latina, 
eds. Hans-Otto Dill and Gabriele Knauer (Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert Verlag, 1993), 27-36.
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from interpreters, soldiers, diplomats, fur traders, Jesuit missionaries, and 
French-Amerindian métis, mobilized their cultural knowledge to assist French 
and Amerindian leaders in brokering diplomatic agreements, Amerindian 
hunters and French fur traders in fixing peltry prices, and French and Amerindian 
soldiers in coordinating military operations.
I will develop two points in my discussion of intermediaries within France’s 
continental North American empire:
First, the very character of France’s presence in North America – sparsely 
populated French settlements in close proximity to Amerindian groups, commercial 
activity grounded in the fur trade, and missionary campaigns aimed at bringing the 
Christian gospel to the native populations of the Americas – guaranteed that French 
and Amerindian communities entered into a variety of strong relationships. This 
fact defined the environment within which cultural intermediaries learned the 
kinds of knowledge which made it possible to bridge cultural gaps.
Second, the character of the French presence in North America also defined an 
environment which made intermediaries’ skills invaluable. Go-betweens played 
a crucial role not only in making French-Amerindian coexistence possible, but in 
extending and sustaining French influence.
II. French-Amerindian Coexistence in New France
The history of French empire in North America is one of frustrated ambitions 
and unlikely successes. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the French 
monarchy shared with the other major European powers a clear set of ideas 
concerning empire in general, and the shape it intended its future American 
empire to take in particular8. The crown, chief officials like Jean-Baptiste Colbert, 
apologists for royal authority and empire, theoreticians of the mercantilist 
system, and wealthy investors in the monopoly trading companies founded 
their imperial ambitions upon three distinct goals. First, the Americas were 
seen as the site for potentially profitable commercial ventures, regions from 
which natural resources as varied as Brazilian redwood, Canadian peltries 
and Caribbean sugar could be extracted and brought to the metropole for 
transformation, resale and consumption. Second, the Americas were viewed 
as a tabula rasa upon which the crown could develop ambitious projects of 
colonial settlement, aimed at reproducing forms of social organization, legal 
regimes, property ownership, agricultural development, religious practice, and 
political authority modeled on Old France. Third, the crown was committed to 
assisting the Catholic church in evangelizing the new continent and bringing 
the Christian gospel to its Amerindian inhabitants. The monarchy took concrete 
steps to achieve all three of these objectives: it chartered trading companies 
8 See Anthony Pagden’s examination of European ideologies of empire in the early modern 
period, Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800 (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998).
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with monopolies over commerce in commodities like peltries9; it conducted 
sustained campaigns to recruit French subjects to migrate to New France and 
settle in the young colony, and it imposed seigneurialism and Paris’s customary 
law code upon New France10; and it threw its moral and financial weight behind 
the Catholic church’s missionary enterprise11.
By many measures, this enterprise was a great success. Beginning in the later 
decades of the seventeenth century, a Catholic, agrarian, feudal settler society 
took shape along the St Lawrence river, with smaller outposts in Acadia and the 
Illinois country. Savvy merchants and investors in the fur and salt cod trade took 
in healthy profits. The Society of Jesus established a network of missions deep 
into the Great Lakes region. At its geographical zenith, Versailles commanded 
a vast North American empire stretching from Newfoundland and the Gaspé 
peninsula to the Mississippi river valley.
By many of the crown and colony’s elites’ own criteria, however, New France 
was to a certain extent a failure. Royal efforts to recruit settlers notwithstanding, 
only a small number of French subjects crossed the Atlantic to live in Canada. 
In the period between 1660 and 1759, a mere 75,000 Frenchmen migrated 
to New France; by comparison, in the period between 1700 and 1775, nearly 
500,000 people settled in the thirteen British colonies in North America12. The 
long-term corollary to this migratory imbalance was a stark divergence in the 
two kingdom’s American colonies’ demographic fortunes. New France remained 
sparsely populated, counting only 3,215 white inhabitants in 1666, and a mere 
42,000 in 1730 (including the Louisiana colony); in 1730, Britain’s thirteen 
colonies counted 400,000 souls13.
9 Commerce is probably the most thoroughly studied aspect of France’s presence in the 
Americas. See for example Cameron Nish, Les Bourgeois-Gentilshommes de la Nouvelle-France, 1729-
1748 (Ville Saint-Laurent: Fides, 1968), Dale Miquelon, Dugard of Rouen: French Trade to Canada 
and the West Indies, 1729-1770 (Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1978), 
Miquelon, New France, 1701-1744: A Supplement to Europe (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1987), 
Miquelon, “Canada’s Place in the French Imperial Economy: An Eighteenth-Century Overview”, 
French Historical Studies, 15, 3 (Spring 1988): 432-443, and John F. Bosher, The Canada Merchants, 
1713-1763 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
10 See for example Leslie Choquette, Frenchmen into Peasants: Modernity and Tradition in the 
Peopling of French Canada (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), Louis Dechêne, Habitants 
and Merchants in Seventeenth Century Montreal (Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1992), and Allan Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec Parishes, 
1740-1840 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985).
11 See Carole Blackburn, Harvest of Souls: The Jesuit Missions and Colonialism in North America, 1632-1650 
(Montréal-Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000) and Dominique Deslandres, Croire et 
faire croire. Les missions françaises au XVIIe siècle (1600-1650) (Paris: Fayard, 2003).
12 Compare fi gures in Choquette, Frenchmen into Peasants with Aaron Fogleman, “Migrations 
to the Thirteen British North American Colonies, 1700-1775: New Estimates”, Journal of 
Interdisciplinary History, 22, 4 (Spring 1992): 691-709.
13 Population fi gures in James Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 31, 321, and 423-427.
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French settlements’ low population densities had important consequences 
for French relations with Amerindian communities. Unlike the dynamic, robust, 
and densely populated colonies of British North America, engaged in intensive 
agriculture and commerce, and which progressively pushed native groups to 
their boundaries, New France’s inhabitants generally lived in close proximity 
to Amerindian communities. The French colony’s white settlers could not avoid 
coming into frequent contact with Amerindians, even in urbanized centers like 
Québec and Montréal.
The French colony’s broader objectives generated three distinct ‘push factors’ 
which drew Frenchmen away from French settlements on the St Lawrence and into 
the largely Amerindian world beyond. The first was commercial: initially founded 
by trading companies with monopolies on the fur trade, New France’s economic 
fortunes depended upon the maintenance of lasting relationships with Amerindian 
suppliers of peltries. Coureurs des bois lived in close proximity with Amerindians to 
hunt and trap animals, trade for furs, and supply the French merchants in Québec 
and Montréal who then resold furs to the hungry French market.
The second was geopolitical. Faced with the menace of Britain’s North 
American colonies and its substantially greater population, wealth, and military 
power, the French sought out Amerindian political allies and military auxiliaries 
to complement their own limited financial, demographic and military resources. 
Indeed, for the French monarchy, the establishment of diplomatic agreements 
and military alliances with Amerindian communities stood at the very heart of its 
strategy to defend its North American colony14. The crown’s financial investment 
in establishing and sustaining these alliances made up nearly a quarter of its total 
expenditures in the colony15. As Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, who served as 
governor of New France from 1703 to 1725, put it, “The policy of a governor of 
Canada does not consist so much in taking care of the French who are within 
the scope of his government as in maintaining a close union with the savage 
Nations that are his Allies”16. Strategic imperatives thus sent royal officials to 
negotiate alliances with Amerindian groups, French soldiers to fight alongside 
native allies and man French forts and trading posts along the Great Lakes and 
the Mississippi.
14 On the role of France’s Amerindian diplomatic and military partners in confl icts with Britain, 
see Richard R. Johnson, “The Search for a Usable Indian: An Aspect of the Defense of Colonial 
New England’, Journal of American History, 63, 3 (December 1977): 623-651, White, Middle Ground, 
and Denys Delâge, “War and the French-Indian Alliance”, European Review of Native American 
Studies, 5, 1 (1991): 15-20.
15 Catherine Desbarats, “The Cost of Early Canada’s Native Alliances: Reality and Scarcity’s 
Rhetoric”, William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 52, 4 (October 1995), 609-630.
16 Archives Nationales de France, Centre des Archives d’Outre-Mer (Aix-en-Provence), Colonies, 
F3, vol. 7, fols. 178, 252-253, quoted here from Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-
Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century, Phyllis Aronoff and Howard Scott (trans.) (Montréal-
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 181.
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The third push factor was religious. French Catholic religious orders, 
including the Recollect Friars, the Ursuline sisters, and the Society of Jesus, and 
with the direct assistance of the crown, set the Christian evangelical imperative 
imperative to work by establishing missions aimed at converting Amerindians 
to Christianity. Jesuit priests in particular settled among the Huron, Iroquois 
and other groups, to build missions and begin the challenging, long-term task of 
converting Amerindians to Catholicism.
Furthermore, a number of ‘pull factors’ encouraged various inhabitants of 
the French colony to leave of their own initiative and integrate Amerindian 
communities in varying degrees. The extremely skewed sex ratio within the 
French colony – the 1666 census indicated that two-thirds of New France’s 
white inhabitants were men, a situation which did not reach equilibrium until 
the eighteenth century –, and Amerindian sex ratios skewed in turn towards 
women among communities whose male populations had been decimated 
by warfare, created strong incentives for French men to flee poor marriage 
prospects on the St Lawrence and instead seek female companionship among 
the Algonquin or Huron. The booming fur trade likewise created economic 
incentives for young men to abandon the life of peasantry and agricultural 
labor that awaited them within the colony to chase the substantial profits 
which could be made in the peltry exchange. The fur trade and the Amerindian 
sexual economy convinced many to become coureurs des bois.
New France thus took shape as a modest, thinly peopled European-style 
settlement which constantly bled large numbers of colonists, who left to spend 
substantial stretches of time among Amerindian communities in what was 
called the Pays d’en haut (which the British would later call Upper Canada)17. It 
thus differed in fundamental ways from its British neighbors to the south. It also 
diverged from the hopes and goals which the French crown had set for it. The 
monarchy repeatedly attempted to set the colony back on its alleged course. Louis 
XIV’s program to offer passage and dowries to 700 unmarried women hailing from 
modest backgrounds to be married to French colonists was aimed at equalizing 
the colony’s skewed sex ratios18. The monarchy also regularly tried to close the Pays 
17 On French and Amerindian coexistence, see White, The Middle Ground, Jan Grabowski, 
“Searching for the Common Ground: Natives and French in Montreal, 1700-1730”, in 
Proceedings of the Eighteenth Meeting of the French Colonial Historical Society, Montréal, May 
1992, ed. James Pritchard (Cleveland: French Colonial Historical Society, 1993), 59-73, 
Grabowski, “The Common Ground: Settled, Natives and French in Montreal, 1667-1760”, 
Ph.D dissertation, Université de Montréal (1993), Greer, The People of New France (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1997), Havard, Empire et métissages, and Denys Delâge, “L’Alliance 
franco-amérindienne des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Spécificités, changements de régime, 
mémoires”, in Actes du Colloque international Expériences et mémoire. Partager en français la 
diversité du monde, University of Bucarest, 12-16 September 2006, http://www.celat.ulaval.ca/
histoire.memoire/b2006/Delage.pdf .
18 See Choquette, Frenchmen into Peasants and Yves Landry, Orphelines en France, pionnières au 
Canada. Les filles du roi au XVIIe siècle (Montréal: Lémeac, 1992).
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d’en haut to French men, by prohibiting them from leaving the St Lawrence. The 
fact that these latter measures were largely failures testifies to the Amerindians 
world’s considerable political, social and commercial importance for the French 
presence in North America – and the considerable force of attraction this world 
exercised over many of the colony’s inhabitants19. It illustrates the paradox of an 
imperial venture which, though conceived as an attempt to reproduce a white, 
European, Catholic, sedentary and largely agricultural society on the American 
continent, found itself compelled to abandon much of this ideal and instead 
pursue coexistence and cooperation with Amerindians20.
III. Go-Betweens
In a thinly peopled empire, built upon the fur trade and imbued with a religious 
ethos oriented to the conversion of the other, and whose good conscience, 
prosperity and, indeed, very survival were predicated on cultivating and 
maintaining close relationships with Amerindian partners, intermediaries and go-
betweens of all sorts fulfilled decisive functions. Diplomats negotiated treaties and 
military alliances, coureurs des bois brought Amerindian fur trappers and French fur 
traders together, métis helped Jesuit priests master local tongues and make sense of 
Amerindian religious beliefs, cultural brokers smoothed over misunderstandings, 
and interpreters helped people bridge intractable language gaps21. It was France’s 
capacity to recruit and train go-betweens that made it possible to project French 
influence far into the interior of the North American continent.
The need for intermediaries – particularly interpreters capable of bridging 
language barriers – manifested itself from the very beginning of contact. As 
everywhere in the early stages of European colonization in the Americas, one 
of the earliest solutions was to convince or coerce Amerindians to cross the 
Atlantic to spend an extended period in France, learn French, and then serve as 
interpreters upon their return to North America. Jacques Cartier, for example, 
kidnapped the sons of an Indian chief and forced them to winter in Saint-Malo 
(although Cartier ultimately convinced the chief to grant his approval)22. As 
time went on, the French succeeded in enticing Amerindians to make the trip to 
France voluntarily, thus forsaking kidnapping23.
19 See Havard, Empire et métissages.
20 For a similar argument, see Havard and Vidal, Histoire de l’Amérique française, 12.
21 See for example Victor E. Hanzeli, “De la connaissance des langues indiennes de la 
Nouvelle France aux dix-septième et dix-huitième siècles”, Amerindia: Revue d’Ethnolinguistique 
Amérindienne, 6 (1984): 209-225.
22 Jacques Cartier, Relations, ed. Michel Bideaux (Montréal: Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 
1986), 2nd relation, ch. 2, 135-138, and ch. 3, 142.
23 On the kidnapping of Amerindians to train interpreters, see Bruce G. Trigger and William R. 
Swagerty, “Entertaining Strangers: North America in the Sixteenth Century”, in The Cambridge 
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The French also set out to master Amerindian tongues for themselves. The 
authors of many early travel accounts took pains to transcribe Indian words as 
they learned them – like Cartier, who notes in passing that the Algonquian “call a 
hatchet in their language cochy and a knife bacan”24 – and to include rudimentary 
lexicons. Such evidence illustrates not only how rapidly a minimal knowledge 
of local cultures was acquired, but also their authors’ concerns to transmit this 
knowledge and accelerate the process of training intermediaries. Only extensive 
immersion in Amerindian societies could make possible the genuine acquisition 
of a deeper familiarity with their languages and cultures – a fact, as we have 
seen, that Champlain clearly recognized. It was precisely those Frenchmen who 
spent long periods of time among Amerindians, like fur traders, soldiers and 
missionaries, who could ultimately serve as effective intermediaries.
Like Champlain, French officials in general clearly understood the 
importance of locating and retaining competent and reliable interpreters. 
They frequently offered regular interpreters long-term, remunerated offices. 
Particularly valuable linguistic intermediaries were sometimes thanked for 
their services with substantial titles or rewards. The Brittany native Olivier 
Letardif, who had learned Montagnais, Huron and Algonquin while working 
with the Jesuits, served Champlain and the royal superintendant of New 
France as clerk-interpreter, purchased a share in the seigneurie of Beaupré and 
ultimately served as seigneurial judge25. Charles Le Moyne, born in Normandy, 
served the Jesuits in Huronia, before working as an interpreter and a soldier for 
the French army, was subsequently granted a seigneurie and a noble title26. In the 
culturally social and fluid world of New France, where social barriers could be 
porous and interactions with Amerindian groups a commonplace fact, cultural 
intermediaries could parlay their skills into an upward social trajectory that 
would have been unthinkable in Old France.
Cultural intermediaries’ skills made them indispensable actors in the 
mediation of European-Amerindian diplomatic, commercial and social relations, 
which in turn gave them considerable influence as individuals. Well aware of 
History of the Native Peoples of the Americas, vol. I, North America, [1996], pt. 1, 325-398, es 337-338, 
James Axtell, “At the Water’s Edge: Trading in the Sixteenth Century”, in After Columbus: Essays 
in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 144-181, 
and Cornelius J. Jaenen, Friend and Foe: Aspects of French-Amerindian Contact in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), es 12-15.
24 Cartier, Relations, 1st relation, ch. 18, 113: “appellent ung hachot en leur langue cochy et ung 
cousteau bacan”.
25 Marcel Trudel, “Olivier Letardif”, in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, vol. 1, http://
www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=407&interval=25&&PHPSESSID=s1u60pa
61pe0o5rfv55ciubia6 (consulted 25 May 2010).
26 Jean-Jacques Lefebvre, “Charles le Moyne de Longueil et de Châteauguay”, in Dictionary of 
Canadian Biography Online, vol. 1, http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=42
6&&PHPSESSID=s1u60pa61pe0o5rfv55ciubia6 (consulted 25 May 2010).
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their importance in brokering Franco-Amerindian relationships, intermediaries 
naturally sought to capitalize on their role, and were jealous of their precious 
cultural knowledge. French Jesuits who at the start of their missions worked 
hard to acquire Amerindian tongues so as to be equipped to preach the Christian 
good news, often found interpreters – whether Amerindian, French, or métis – 
extremely reluctant to help them learn local idioms. Jesuits filled the pages of 
their Relations with desperate laments concerning recalcitrant interpreters and 
language teachers. In one example, Pierre Biard complained that “This Interpreter 
had never wanted to communicate his knowledge of the language to any one, not 
even to the Reverend Recollect Fathers, who had constantly importuned him for 
ten years”27. In another instance, the same Jesuit threw up his hands concerning 
an Amerindian who had traveled to France, learned French and been baptized 
a Catholic there, but had given up Christianity after returning to Canada: “the 
perfidy of the Apostate, who, contrary to his promise, and notwithstanding the 
offers I made him, was never willing to teach me, – his disloyalty even going so 
far as to purposely give me a word of one signification for another”28. Here, an 
intermediary furnished false linguistic information in order to throw his eager 
pupil off the cultural scent. For intermediaries, to disseminate mastery of their 
skill set would have been to debase their own value and importance.
Their functions as indispensable linchpins and facilitators of intercultural 
dialogue made it possible for intermediaries to manipulate their skills in more 
surreptitious ways as well. For French officials, merchants and missionaries 
who were largely or even entirely dependent on go-betweens in their dealings 
with Amerindians constantly faced the possibility that their intermediaries 
were not working in good faith on their behalf. Interpreters for example could 
conceal, mistranslate, invent or modify messages across language barriers. Such 
actions could lead to serious misunderstandings, modify the outcome of trade 
negotiations, or influence diplomatic conversations. In one episode which took 
place during one of Jacques Cartier’s Canadian expeditions, when the French had 
intended to exchange European goods they considered to be of little value for 
peltries, they learned to their chagrin that their interpreters had revealed to their 
Amerindian interlocutors that “what we bartered to them was of no value, and 
that for what they brought us, they could as easily get hatchets as knives”29.
27 See Biard, Relation (1616), quoted here from The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels 
and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France 1610-1791, ed. Reuben Gold Thwaites 
(Cleveland: Burrows Brothers, 1896-1901), vol. 4, 210-211: “ce Truchement n’avoit jamais voulu 
communiquer a personne la cognoissance qu’il avoit de ce langage, non pas mesme aux RR. 
Recolects, qui depuis dix ans n’avoient cessé de l’en importuner”. 
28 Le Jeune, Relation (1635), in Jesuit Relations, ed. Thwaites, vol. 7, 112, 283n: “En tant d’années 
qu’on a esté en ces païs, on n’a jamais rien pü tirer de l’interprete ou truchement nommé 
Marsolet, qui pour excusé disoit qu’il avoit juré qu’il ne donneroit rien du langage des 
Sauvages à qui que ce fût”.
29 Quoted from Axtell, “At the Water’s Edge”, 160.
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Amerindian groups likewise recognized the advantages that could accrue 
from limiting European access to knowledge of their own cultures. Controlling 
the mediation of cultural difference made it possible for natives to more 
successfully define the terms of their relationships with Europeans. Le Jeune 
summed up his frustration with Nicolas Marsolet, a native of Rouen who had 
learned the Montagnais and Algonquin languages while in Canada, as follows: 
“In all the years that we have been in this country no one has ever been able to 
learn anything from the interpreter named Marsolet, who, for excuse, said he 
had sworn that he would never teach the Savage tongue to any one whomsoever”. 
Marsolet’s remark points to the possibility that Amerindian communities 
themselves sought to restrict the dissemination of their linguistic knowledge, 
by imposing oaths upon interpreters not to reveal their philological secrets. Even 
if Marsolet’s defense was merely a self-serving fiction, he clearly expected it to be 
plausible to the Jesuit, suggesting that this was a familiar phenomenon in New 
France30. In seventeenth-century New Netherlands, for example, a Dutchman 
observed precisely this phenomenon:
that they [local Indian communities] rather try to conceal their language from us than 
to properly communicate it, except in things that have to do with everyday trade, 
saying that it is sufficient for us to understand them to this extent31.
Likewise, Amerindian leaders and shamans sometimes counseled their 
communities to refuse to teach their languages to Jesuits, recognizing in 
missionaries’ linguistic curiosity a prelude to future attempts to carry out a 
wholesale transformation in their belief systems. Le Jeune for example recalled 
having to face “the malice of the sorcerer [a shaman], who sometimes prevented 
them from teaching me”32. These examples suggest that Amerindians sought 
to control the training of go-betweens and intermediaries, so as to resist 
outside influence over their communities and manage the character of their 
relationships with the French.
A comparison of the history of cultural intermediaries in Britain’s North 
American colonies throws the specificity of the French case into sharp relief. The 
inhabitants of British North America experienced considerably greater difficulties 
in training and recruiting go-betweens than the French. In the period following first 
30 Le Jeune, Relation (1635), in  Jesuit Relations, ed. Thwaites, vol. 7, 30-31: “la perfidie de 
l’Apostat, qui contre sa promesse, & nonobstant les offres que le luy faisois, ne m’a jamais 
voulu enseigner, voire sa déloyauté est venuë jusques à ce point de me donner exprez un mot 
d’une signification pour un autre”.
31 James H. Merrell, “ ‘The Customes of Our Countrey’: Indians and Colonists in Early America”, 
in Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire, eds. Bernard Bailyn and 
Philip D. Morgan (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 117-156, quote on 129.
32 See for example the Jesuit Paul Le Jeune’s complaints in Le Jeune, Relation (1635), in 
Jesuit Relations, ed. Thwaites, vol. 7, 30-31: “la malice du sorcier qui defendoit par fois qu’on 
m’enseignast”. 
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contact, the British case followed that of the other European powers, and whenever 
possible Englishmen themselves served as intermediaries or interpreters, or local 
authorities sought out competent go-betweens. Subsequently, however, British 
colonial authorities began to demand that Amerindians who did business with 
them learn the English tongue themselves. In the 1670s, the government of 
Virginia required that Amerindians furnish their own interpreters. During the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonial authorities fixed knowledge of 
English as a prerequisite for Amerindians who wished to submit to British rule as 
settlement Indians. In Maryland, for example, the Piscataway chief began to study 
English, rejected polygamy, adopted English dress, and embraced Christianity33. In 
their relations with their powerful Iroquois neighbors, British authorities in New 
England experienced substantial difficulties in scaring up effective interpreters 
and intermediaries. At the start of the eighteenth century, the government of New 
York does not appear to have been aware of a single Englishman who could speak 
the Iroquoian tongue. They instead named Lawrence Claessen van der Volgen, 
a Dutchman who had become a fluent Iroquois speaker after being taken into 
captivity in the 1690 Iroquois raid on Schenectady. The fact that Claessen knew no 
English made this a particularly awkward arrangement, and British officials had 
to call upon a second interpreter to translate their Dutch interpreter’s rendering 
of Iroquois from the Dutch language into English34.
The British ‘failure’ to mediate cultural difference with the Amerindian 
groups with which they came into contact stems from divergences in local 
conditions in the two sets of North American colonies. As we have already seen, 
Britain’s colonies differed from France’s territories in fundamental respects: 
land-hungry, densely populated, based upon European-style agriculture, 
and less committed to disseminating the Christian faith among America’s 
indigenous peoples, Britain’s relationships with neighboring Amerindian 
groups were in general substantially more hostile than those of the French. 
Surer of its military power and demographic resources, its society organized 
at greater remove from the Amerindian world, its economy more autonomous 
from Amerindian partnerships, and less engaged in the cross-cultural 
missionary dialogue, the British simply did not need or rely upon go-betweens 
to anywhere the same degree that the French did.
4. Conclusion
What does this discussion of the importance of cultural intermediaries tell us 
about the nature of France’s North American empire? I would argue that it should 
draw our attention to four important characteristics of this historical experience.
33 Merrell, “The Customes of Our Countrey”, 129-130.
34 See Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of 
European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), passim, and esp. 220.
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First, go-betweens played crucial roles in situations of cultural contact like 
that which prevailed in New France. Trade, intercultural dialogue, coexistence, 
political and military cooperation all depended upon the training and ready 
availability of culturally and linguistically competent intermediaries. This was a 
generalized phenomenon throughout the early modern Americas wherever and 
whenever Europeans and Amerindians faced off.
Second, the specific character of France’s North American empire lent 
intermediaries particular importance in facilitating those activities and functions 
most important to its survival and vocation: commerce, diplomacy and military 
alliances with Amerindian partners, and the Catholic missionary enterprise. In this 
New France, composed of small colonial settlements located amidst independent 
and powerful Amerindian communities, whose prosperity and vitality depended 
upon the French-Amerindian peltry exchange, and whose strategic security in 
the face of rapidly growing British colonies likewise rested upon the assistance 
and cooperation of native military partners, intermediaries were kept busy doing 
indispensable work. To a certain extent, their capacity to successfully negotiate 
otherness stood at the very heart of the French imperial project.
Third, not only was intermediaries’ work central to New France’s security, 
prosperity, stability and day-to-day social life, it was nothing less than the key 
which made the extension and maintenance of French influence in North 
America possible. No asset was more valuable for the French with which to 
perpetuate their presence on the continent and protect it from Britain than 
the capacity to confront ‘otherness’, to attain a substantive understanding of 
the languages, cultural attitudes, political systems, intentions, and commercial 
interests of a range of actual and potential Amerindian partners. France’s success 
in establishing a vast North American empire which, at its zenith, reached 
from the Gulf of Mexico north to the Great Lakes, and east to the Atlantic 
depended upon the mobilization of go-betweens in order to broker partnerships 
with native allies. As we saw in the episode with which we began this article, 
Champlain displayed from the colony’s very beginnings a clear understanding 
of the importance of establishing cooperative relationships with Amerindians 
and of cultivating go-betweens when he sent French men off to join Amerindian 
communities. Cultural intermediaries should be seen as the ‘weapons of the weak’ 
for a fragile empire35, a precious imperial ‘force multiplier’, a form of ‘soft power’ 
which allowed the French crown to leverage modest demographic, economic and 
military resources into a set of Franco-Amerindian partnerships which, when 
taken as a whole, represented something substantially more formidable.
And finally, the crucial, and as yet not fully understood, role of go-betweens 
in the history of French America throws into sharp relief essential features of 
France’s North American empire which distinguish it from the other European 
35 The notion of “imperial weapons of the weak” is a nod to James Scott’s concept of Weapons 
of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), who 
defines it in an entirely different context.
237cultural intermediaries in new france
empires in the Americas. The formal conceptions of empire which European 
theorists developed on behalf of their patrons – including those who planned, 
promoted and defended the French imperial project – fixed as their objective the 
emergence of empires organized around European settler societies at their core. 
This was precisely what took shape in Britain’s thirteen North American colonies, 
and in a more modest scale in the French settlements which grew up along the 
St Lawrence. But, as our discussion suggests, it would be a mistake to consider 
this the true ‘core’ of France’s imperial presence. Rather, it was the arc of military 
posts, trading stations, and Jesuit missions which, in spite of their location along 
the very edges of French colonial settlement in the Americas, made it possible 
to link the Great Lakes, the Mississippi river valley and Louisiana together into 
a loose network capable of representing and promoting French interests. The 
soldiers, interpreters, coureurs de bois, fur traders, métis and Jesuit priests who 
could mediate the various French and Amerindian cultural worlds between 
which they shuttled, helped to broker the associations, compromises and 
agreements which allowed Franco-Amerindian coexistence and cooperation to 
take place. To a very real degree, then, France’s ‘empire’ was not a form of colonial 
or imperial domination over native peoples at all (despite the fact that this is what 
the French crown had initially intended). Rather, it was both constituted and 
perpetuated by a loose web of partnerships and interdependent relationships 
between the French and Amerindian allies. In this world, decision-making could 
not be centralized in Versailles, or even in colonial capitals like Québec. Power 
was instead disseminated diffusely and widely in a complex and multipolar 
environment, shared between royal officials, fur traders, missionaries, settlers, 
and the Amerindian partners with which they interacted and upon whom 
the success of their commercial, religious, political and military enterprises 
depended. In a world built upon intercultural negotiation and cooperation – 
however vexed and problematic –, cultural intermediaries were the linchpins of 
the French imperial system, the sites and sinews of French power in New France, 
the real core of an imperial configuration quite unlike that of the other European 
empires in the Americas.
